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Introduction
The twelve years that have passed since the catastrophic terrorist strike of 9/11 have seen a complex, apparently dialogic, interaction between human rights and non-trial based counterterrorist measures in the UK. That interaction has led to modification of such measures, seeing detention without trial give way to control orders, which in turn were superseded by terrorism prevention and investigation measures under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIMA). But the inception of the more ECHR-compliant TPIMA was rapidly followed by the introduction of the Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and 10 The demand that a deferential judicial approach should be taken when the derogation was challenged sought to stifle dialogue, 11 relying instead on acceptance of an imperative to accommodate executive measures designed to enhance security. 14 But their repressive nature indicated implicit reliance on a recalibrated version of Article 5, able to accommodate to the needs of the crisis. 15 Although the courts' response meant that the control orders' scheme had to be modified to achieve greater ECHR-compatibility, albeit this time without rejecting it wholesale, 16 the courts partially acquiesced, it will be argued, in the notion of such breached the Article 14 rights of the appellants, that the standard of review was whether 'it was legitimately open to the primary decision-makers to draw the dividing line where they did' [86] . The key argument on behalf of the government was: 'As it was for Parliament and the Executive to assess the threat facing the nation, so it was for those bodies and not the courts to judge the response necessary to protect the security of the public. These were matters…calling for an exercise of political and not judicial judgment…' [107] . 12 In relation to judicial responses T Poole terms this model one of 'deferential accommodation', finding that within it judges are prepared to 'accommodate executive needs by recognising a broad area of largely untrammelled executive discretion:' 'Courts 15 See the discussion of early 'heavy touch' control orders below. See also H. Fenwick, 'Recalibrating ECHR Rights, and The Role of The Human Rights Act Post 9/11: Reasserting International Human Rights Norms in the "War On Terror"?' (2010) 63 CLP 153. Under Poole's view such accommodation does not involve the overt suspension of constitutional norms or an extensive use of the concept of non-justiciability; rather, it involves an attitude of extreme deference in relation to the executive view of measures needed to combat risk: n 12 above. Oren Gross takes a somewhat similar view in speaking of an 'emergency interpretation' of the US Constitution as opposed to an explicit suspension of it, meaning that constitutional limitations can be redefined in order to seek to overcome the emergency rapidly: 'Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional? ' (2003) Superficially it appeared that as 9/11 receded a more measured assessment of the threat occurred, conducive of a return to normality and a re-balancing in favour of human rights, largely through court action, but with some Parliamentary intervention. The process could be viewed as a classic movement in public law terms, but so doing could aid in enabling repressive measures to creep in under the radar -as arguably has occurred in respect of ETPIMs -and in removing the spotlight from the prolonged use of 'emergency' measures.
The government took the stance in relation to the TPIM and ETPIM legislation that the principles underlying non-trial based interference with liberty and use of closed material proceedings, had been accorded a clean bill of human rights health by the courts during the control orders saga. 28 This was put forcibly to parliamentary committees scrutinising the legislation, partly via the use of 'ECHR memos' 29 -in general supportive of dialogue, but in this instance, it is argued, partially mis-used -and the way was paved for the continued reliance on such measures, including the repressive turn taken in the form of ETPIMs. 30 The 'checking' role of the ECHR gave way, to an extent, to a ratification role, as this commentary will argue, which itself fosters accommodationism in an insidious manner. 26 Repealed under Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 59. 27 Section 61 inserted s 47A into the TA, creating a more tightly worded power. It might also be noted that a consultation on Sched 7 TA has occurred which might lead to reform of that heavily executive-dominated process to create clearer human rights compliance, although no commitment to such reform is as yet evident. See: 'Review of the Operation of Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 A public consultation' Home Office, September 2012, at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/157896/consultationdocument.pdf (last visited 28 April 2013). 28 36 See the government review of counter-terrorism powers: Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers Home Office, Report Cm 8004 (2011) which concluded that control orders should be abandoned but such measures should be maintained, and that an enhanced version -which emerged in the form of ETPIMs -might also be needed to meet an emergency: (para 30(v)). See also ETPIM Bill Joint Committee, n 3, para 80. This model has often been termed preventive as opposed to punitive, 37 in the sense that it relies on targeting terrorist suspects to curtail their liberty without the need for a trial, by imposing specific restrictions on them, related to the particular types of activity it is thought that they might engage in, with the aim of preventing future terrorist activity before it occurs. Since reliance on TPIMs/ETPIMs has essentially the same purpose as control orders had, both TPIMA and the ETPIM Bill rely heavily on the control orders model: so the legal design of both instruments is similar in a range of respects 38 since both measures have the same 'preventive' aim.
Purpose of the TPIMs and ETPIMs schemes
The more repressive ETPIMs appear to be designed to address a heightened threat. They could be used against any terrorism suspect, as discussed below. More specifically, nine suspects who had been subjected to control orders were transferred onto TPIMs at the beginning of January 2012 39 and they will come to the end of their TPIMs at the end of December 2013. The question will be whether certain suspects, deemed especially high risk, 40 should be subjected to no constraint or to an ETPIMs notice 41 if they are still perceived as presenting a threat to security. 42 If the ETPIMs Bill is introduced the enhanced measures provide the opportunity of imposing greater restraint on such suspects, thereby providing a solution of sorts to the problem for another two years (till end December 2015). That possibility could provide a rationale for introducing the ETPIMs Bill, as David Anderson QC has acknowledged. 43 The case could also be made that the powers available under a TPIMs notice are insufficient in relation to particular suspects. The basis on which Parliament might be asked to accept the introduction of the Bill remains uncertain 44 and does not exclude the possibility that a trigger circumstance might arise if the security service advice was that it was not acceptable for certain of the suspects currently under TPIMs to be able to move 37 See further n 8 above. 38 The ETPIM Bill also relies heavily on the 2011 Act: a large number of the sections of TPIMA are also applied to ETPIMs (under clause 3 ETPIM Bill): ss4-16, 17(1) and (2), 18, 22-24, Scheds 2-6. 39 See Anderson 'TPIMs in 2012' n 34 above, paras 4.1-4.17. 40 Anderson ibid found that certain suspects were at the very high end of risk, even by the standards of international terrorism: para 4.12. 41 Or to a new TPIMs one, but in that case only if fresh terrorism-related activity is reasonably believed to be present. 42 So long as the threshold for the imposition of ETPIMs -on the balance of probabilities -is met. It may be noted that Anderson (n 34 above, para 11.33-11.38) has argued that the probation service and services provided as part of the government's counter terror Prevent strategy should be relied on more heavily in relation to TPIM subjects in terms of de-radicalisation. 43 See above n 30, 6 ('if you had…people who are assessed to be very dangerous, coming to the end of a two-9 freely around the country or meet with certain associates when their two-year period is up, where surveillance would not meet the heightened threat or would require resources to do so that were not available. 45 The leeway, discussed below, under the ETPIM Bill for transferring such suspects to an ETPIM from a TPIM, may contradict the notion that ETPIMs are reserved only for a new crisis situation. 47 Under TPIMA, s 9(2) (discussed below) the court, on the full hearing on the order, has to decide whether the Secretary of State's decision is 'flawed', applying judicial review principles, which include compliance with Convention rights. This echoes the position regarding control orders, and will apply to ETPIMs (ETPIM Bill, cl 3 applies TPIMA, ss 4-16 to ETPIMs). 48 Since temporary ETPIMs can be imposed under TPIMA, s 26 the provisions governing their use reflect those changes now also contained in the ETPIM Bill: s26(6) 'The provision of a temporary enhanced TPIM order which corresponds to section 3 must include appropriate variations from the provision contained in that section…'. 49 Terrorism-related activity is defined in TPIMA, s 4(1); the definition is very broad, as under the PTA. It covers inter alia encouragement of the preparation of such acts: 'involvement in terrorism related activity is any one or more of the following (a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; (b) conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so; (c) conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so; (d) conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in conduct falling within (a)-(c) and for the purposes of this subsection it is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism generally.' Under s 4(2) it is immaterial whether the involvement in the activity took place before or after the passing of TPIMA. 56 and in CC, CF, the argument was rejected that under TPIMA the standard of proof is higher than 'the reasonable belief' standard in that the foundation of past facts upon which the belief is predicated must be proved on the balance of probabilities.
Imposition of TPIMs and ETPIMs
57 50 All the suspects at that time on control orders were transferred to TPIMs, so the material supporting the level of suspicion previously applicable was also deemed to be sufficient under the slightly higher standard: see ETPIM Bill Joint Committee n 3, 7. On the other hand, police evidence is apparently to the effect that certain suspects who had not been subjected to control orders were not placed on TPIM notices due to this higher standard of proof: Anderson 'TPIMs in 2012,' n 34 above, para 2.23. 51 Condition E (in both instruments, but in ETPIM Bill, cl 2) is that the court must give permission for the imposition of the TPIM, but under s 3(5)(b) (clause 2(5)(b) ETPIM Bill) permission is not needed if the Secretary of State 'reasonably considers' that the case is urgent. 52 It may be noted that the term 'purposes connected with' slightly dilutes the requirement for control orders that each obligation imposed had to be considered necessary for the purpose of protecting the public from a risk of terrorism. 53 
Time periods under TPIMs, ETPIMs or both combined
A TPIM notice can only be imposed for a two-year maximum period, 61 although a fresh TPIM can then be imposed if a reasonable belief can be shown that 'new' terrorism-related 58 Clause 2(1) ETPIM Bill. If the presence of the TRA is established on the balance of probabilities, it appears that either a TPIMs or ETPIM notice could be imposed, but not both at the same time (ETPIM Bill clause 4(1)).
Since s26 TPIMA provides for the use of temporary ETPIMs (see n 2 above) the same threshold is used. It may be noted that reliance in the Bill on a number of provisions of TPIMA, includes the definition of Terrorismrelated activity (TRA) in TPIMA s4(1). 59 Clause 2(4). 60 Condition B in both: TPIMA s 3(2), ETPIMA cl 2(2). 'New' is defined in TPIMA, s 3(6) and ETPIM Bill, cl 2(6). 61 It can be imposed for one year initially; it may only be imposed for a further year if Conditions A,C,D are met: so it is not necessary for suspicion of new TRA to be present -s 5(1),(2),(3). Where a TPIM has expired it can be 'revived' (s 13(6)) without an application to a Court if it has not been revoked, or extended under s 5 (s 13(6)), and can be revived regardless of revocation or extension if an application to court has been made (s activity has occurred after the imposition of the first notice, 62 
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'new' is therefore a somewhat 'odd adjective' to use. 67 However, he pointed out that the age of the terrorism-related activity is relevant in considering whether Condition C is satisfied since an order will not be necessary unless there is a need to protect the public from a risk of terrorism. 68 In other words, if there has been a very significant time lapse between the point at which the TPIM is being considered and the suspected TRA, Condition C might not be satisfied since the current need to protect the public might not appear to be established.
The position under the ETIM Bill in respect of the need for 'new' TRA is very similar except, significantly, in relation to suspects who have been subjected to a TPIM previously. Again, the term 'new' should not be taken at face value, but as creating in effect three categories of suspect. 69 First there is the category covering those who have never been placed under an 13(7)); it can be revived regardless of it being extended under s 5: s 13(7), s 6(1)(b). Also a TPIM notice may be revoked (s 13(2)) and later renewed when a TPIM subject is taken into custody when he/she has been charged with a criminal offence, meaning that the clock can be stopped: the two-year period could thus be somewhat lengthened, even if the charge is then dropped. 62 TPIMA, ss 3(2), (6)(b). 63 TIPMA, ss 3(2), (6)(c). 64 TPIMA, s 3(6)(a). 65 This follows from s 3(6)(a) and para 4 of Sched 8 which provides that the Secretary of State's powers under the 2011 Act 'are not affected by a control order having been made in relation to that individual'; provided the conditions set out in s3 are satisfied, the Secretary of State is entitled to impose measures by a TPIM notice on an individual in respect of activities which wholly or in part founded the making of the control order. requirement. 72 It would also need to be apparent -to an unspecified standard of proof -that the TPIM restrictions were not sufficient to deal with the risk the suspect created. 73 Thus, a person could have been subjected to a control order, followed by a TPIM, and then by an ETPIM without having re-engaged in new TRA. However, the point made in BM as to Condition C would also apply to ETPIMs: the fact that the TRA is four years or more old, could be taken to mean, especially in relation to less high risk suspects, that the imposition of the ETPIM is not necessary to protect the public from a risk of terrorism.
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Secondly, suspects can be transferred from an ETPIM to a new ETPIM after two years. In that category it is necessary to show that 'new' terrorism related activity occurred after the first notice came into force to impose the new notice. 75 Significantly, clause 11(3) of the ETPIM Bill indicates that after an ETPIM has been imposed, the requirement of 'new' TRA allows for previous TRA also to be taken into account in deciding to impose a further (b) at such earlier time (if any) as is specified in the order'. 70 Clause 2(6)(c). 71 Note that if the Act is repealed, then any enhanced TPIM notices may remain in force for a transitional period of 28 days only, after which they cease to have effect: ETPIM Bill, cl 10. 72 This was addressed in the ETPIM Bill ECHR memo, n 29, para 11: The power to impose an enhanced TPIM notice is not affected by the individual having been subject to a standard TPIM notice or vice versa (clause 4). An enhanced TPIM notice may therefore be imposed on an individual who, when the Bill comes into force, is subject to a standard TPIM notice. A person cannot be bound by a standard TPIM notice while the ETPIM notice is in force (clause 4(1) ETPIM Bill). In such a case, the standard TPIM notice must be revoked before an enhanced notice may be imposed. 73 Clause 2(4)(b). The clause only requires that the Home Secretary 'reasonably considers it necessary' to employ the more onerous restrictions. 74 ETPIM Bill, cl 2(3) Condition C. 75 Clause 2(6)(b). The government made it clear in its response to the Select Committee on ETPIMs that that possibility would be available: 'If the individual re-engages in terrorism-related activity, it is open to the Home Secretary to consider whether to impose a fresh TPIM or, in exceptional circumstances, an ETPIM notice. It would also be possible to consider imposing a TPIM notice on an individual following the end of an ETPIM notice...': n 28, 6 para 2. measure on the controlled person. 76 If two or more ETPIM notices have been in force the 'new' TRA must have occurred after the coming into force of the most recent notice. 77 The third category covers suspects being transferred from an ETPIM to a new TPIM Under section 3(6) of the TPIMA no provision is made requiring new TRA if the suspect had not previously been subject to a TPIM. However, it would appear that the term 'TPIM' in section 3(6)(b) arguably should be interpreted to include the term 'ETPIM', meaning that new TRA would be needed.
David Anderson QC, the current government appointed Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, has found that the two-year limit for TPIMs could have positive results, 'in terms of concentrating minds on the need for serious efforts to prosecute, deport or de-radicalise controlled persons'. 78 However, that is clearly less likely to be the case in relation to ETPIMs,
given that the need for 'new' TRA fails to provide an inhibiting effect on imposing an ETPIM after a TPIM. But even if ETPIMs are introduced, and certain suspects are subjected to them after being subjected to a TPIM, some new TRA would be needed after two years to subject them to a further measure, 79 a clear improvement on the position under control orders.
TPIM or ETPIM restrictions affecting association, communication, movement, property
The obligations that can be imposed under TPIMs are less onerous than those that could be imposed under control orders, or under ETPIMs, in a range of respects. Greater access to electronic communications is allowed since a minimum level of access is specified, 80 relevant to the investigative element of the TPIM scheme, discussed below. Under an ETPIM notice greater restrictions on telephone and internet access can be specified without such a minimum 76 Clause 11(3): 'In a case where: (a) an enhanced TPIM notice has come into force in relation to an individual, and (b) by virtue of the coming into force of that enhanced TPIM notice, terrorism-related activity which occurred before the coming into force of that notice has ceased to be new terrorism-related activity (within the meaning of s2(6)) in relation to that individual for the purposes of that section, the Secretary of State is not prevented from taking account of that activity for the purposes of the continued imposition, or subsequent imposition, of measures on that individual'. 77 Clauses 2(2), 2(6)(c). 78 'Control Orders in 2011,' n 35 above, para 6.34. 79 Taking account of the provision in clause 11(3). 80 The 2011 Act provides in Sched 1 para 7(1): 'The Secretary of State must allow the individual to possess and use (at least) one of each of the following descriptions of device (subject to any conditions on such use as may be specified under sub-para (2)(b)) -3(a) a telephone operated by connection to a fixed line; 3(b) a computer that provides access to the internet by connection to a fixed line (including any apparatus necessary for that purpose); 3(c) a mobile telephone that does not provide access to the internet'.
level so that a total ban on access to such devices can be imposed. ). This could now include eg limitations on use of the internet, preventing access to social media. 94 The obligations listed in the PTA were, formally speaking, only illustrative, although in practice they were relied on. 95 The PTA operated subject to an implied -but unclear -restriction to the effect that the obligations imposed must not breach Article 5 ECHR. That was the apparent position, since otherwise, obviously, the orders could not be viewed as ones that did not require a derogation from that Article. Certain orders were quashed on the basis that they were in fact derogating orders which the Home Secretary had had no power to make -see enables Article 5 to encompass such measures since it focuses on the impact of restrictions on the life the person subject to them would otherwise have been living. 103 In Guzzardi it was found in relation to non-paradigmatic interferences with liberty that the difference between a deprivation of and a restriction on liberty was one of degree, not of substance, and that it was for the court to assess into which category a particular case fell, taking account of a range of criteria, including the 'type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in Guzzardi, is contrasted with that adopted in the control orders jurisprudence.
Domestic Article 5 jurisprudence on non-derogating control orders
When non-derogating control orders were introduced they included (initially) 18 hours daily house detention/arrest (curfew) and forced relocation. 112 As the decisions briefly discussed below indicate, their use therefore relied in effect on a derogation from Article 5 by stealth, or 104 ibid at [92] . Guzzardi was confined on a small island for 16 months within a confined area and subject to house detention for 9 hours overnight daily. That meant that he had to remain in his home (where his family was allowed to reside but which was dilapidated) between 10 pm-7 am; he also had to seek permission to make phone calls or have visitors. He was ordered (although there was no physical restraint such as a fence) to remain in an area of 2.5 square kilometres. The Court noted that there were few opportunities for social contacts. 105 The 'overnight' requirement under TPIMA is 'a requirement, applicable overnight between such hours as are specified, to remain at, or within, the specified residence. in common parlance should be taken to bear some relationship to the hours between which most people would regard it as reasonable to assume that people might be at home, the evening having come to an end. He considered that the hours that could be specified would not extend beyond the period 9.00pm to 7.00am. 134 In ETPIMs. 139 The period is not specified in the ETPIM Bill, Sched 1. That is also the case in relation to temporary ETPIMs under s26(3)(a)(iii) TPIMA. 140 TPIMA, Explanatory notes, para 41. See also TPIMA ECHR memo n 28, para 24. 141 The JCHR has found that its impact on both the suspect and the suspect's family can be described as 'extraordinary': see n 29 above, para 41. 142 146 and Parliament has been informed that both achieve compatibility. 147 Clearly, the possibility of finding a breach of Article 5 is most likely to occur in relation to ETPIM notices, given the ETPIM Bill's exploration of the outer limits of the domestic deprivation of liberty concept. 148 The Home Office memo on the ECHR in relation to ETPIMs relied on the control orders' case-law which strongly emphasised the period of interference with physical liberty -actual confinement 149 -a position which had been reaffirmed in AP, and assumed that the other restraints were ancillary to that confinement. But that position does not comport very obviously with the holistic Guzzardi approach. Further, the memo on the ETPIM Bill assumes quite readily that between fourteen-sixteen hours house detention daily a grey area is apparent within which the imposition of other unusually stringent obligations might tip the balance into a deprivation of liberty. 150 But as discussed Strasbourg has found that daily periods of about 12 hours, but not necessarily 14 hours or more, house detention may fall outside Article 5(1). 151 So the Strasbourg jurisprudence is being to an extent disregarded in relation to ETPIMs. 144 Lord Plant has pointed out that while the schemes may be compatible, the question is whether individual combination of measures imposed on suspects do not create a deprivation of liberty, which may not be the case: HL Deb vol 744, col GC349, 23 April 2013. 145 Sched 1 cl 4. 146 Anderson's response to Lord Platt before the ETPIMS Joint Committee above n 30, Answer to Q30. 147 See both ECHR memos: n 28 and n 29 above. 148 The possibility that the obligations imposed under a particular ETPIM notice could infringe Art 5 raises the question whether the scheme should have been accompanied by a derogation from Art 5, but it is clear at present that the government does not intend to seek one. See also ETPIM Bill Joint Committee, n 3, where the Committee did not reach the conclusion that the scheme was incompatible with Article 5. 149 See n 29 above, para 21. 
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The question of the duration of the interference with liberty and therefore of the cumulative effect of measures imposed over a long period of time is one of the key indicators of a deprivation of liberty at Strasbourg. This question might arise in relation to TPIM notices, since, as indicated above, those subject to them were previously subject to control orders, 152 and this matter is likely to be especially pertinent if a suspect who has been subject to a TPIM is then subjected to an ETPIM. Duration was one of the four factors expressly identified in
Guzzardi as relevant to determining whether a deprivation of liberty had arisen, but in the domestic control order decisions it has received little emphasis. In 2013 it appears that two controlled individuals have been subjected to orders for almost eight years and a further five have been subjected to them for more than six years (including in all cases well over one year on a TPIM notice). 153 Those are obviously very significant periods of time. If some of this group of suspects is then subjected to an ETPIM notice, and the ETPIM notices are challenged, it could be expected that the issue of duration in relation to Article 5 would be pivotal. However the fact that TPIMs or ETPIMs, unlike control orders, do not subsist for an indefinite period, and so an endpoint would be in sight, would obviously be relevant. . 157 On behalf of the government it was argued in Gillan at [55]: 'the purpose for which the police exercised their powers was not to deprive the applicants of their liberty but to conduct a limited search for specified articles'. 25 subject than the House of Lords had done, 158 finding that the use of coercion would be relevant to the question whether a deprivation of liberty had occurred. 159 The element of coercion underpinning the TPIM and ETPIM obligations is therefore one of the strongest indicators that they could cause a deprivation of liberty, following Gillan. It might also be relevant that the coercion has subsisted in respect of all the current persons subjected to these obligations for the periods of time indicated, since all of them were previously subject to control orders. A number of the persons currently subject to TPIM notices have already spent periods of time in prison for breach of the obligations imposed under the control orders that they were previously subjected to. . The purpose had to take account of the rights of the individual as well as the interests of the community, and 'therefore any steps taken must be resorted to in good faith, and must be proportionate to the situation that made the measures necessary'. If those requirements were met, however, Lord Hope at [34] concluded that it would be proper to find that 'measures of crowd control undertaken in the interests of the community would not infringe the Article 5 rights of individual members of the crowd whose freedom of movement was restricted by them' if the measures were proportionate to the aim pursued.
determining that, relying on the context of the imposition of the 'kettle', 166 the purpose of its imposition must be taken into account. 167 Although the Court did not refer expressly to proportionality, it clearly adverted to that concept 168 in finding that the measure taken appeared to be the 'least intrusive and most effective means to be applied', 169 while purporting to avoid relating the public interest argument to the issue of ambit.
Clearly, the crowd control situation in Austin differed from those at stake in relation to TPIMs/ETPIMs, but it could arguably be a small step from Austin to a finding that if a measure interfering with liberty appears to be necessary due to the demands of the terrorist threat, such a measure will not be found to create a deprivation of liberty, if the least intrusive means needed to answer to the threat (such as a 'lighter touch' ETPIM) is adopted. Thus, Austin creates some leeway to allow this purposive principle to make its way into the 165 (2012) 55 EHRR 14. 166 The Court found that in accordance with the Engel criteria for determining when a deprivation of liberty occurs (Engel v Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647) the coercive nature of the containment within the cordon, its duration, and its effect on the applicants, in terms of physical discomfort and inability to leave, pointed towards a deprivation of liberty. 167 
Conclusions
The use of TPIMs appears to fall outside Article 5(1) as far as the detention obligation is concerned under current Strasbourg jurisprudence since it appears that up to twelve hours house detention a day does not create a deprivation of liberty. 175 But the impact of a particularly repressive combination of obligations under a specific TPIM notice, including restrictions that could also affect the materially qualified rights, would be more likely to be found to create a deprivation of liberty at Strasbourg than domestically, given that a line of authority at Strasbourg has more clearly recognised a concept of non-paradigm deprivation of liberty, not centrally focussed on physical confinement, but in terms of coercion, duration and the impact on normal life.
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But it appears to be unarguable that application of a particular TPIM notice is less likely than an ETPIM notice to create incompatibility with Article 5. At present it is probably the case that ETPIM notices would be in accord with the domestic Article 5 jurisprudence on non- In a period of reliance on executive measures interfering with liberty, the question whether a 'deprivation of liberty' refers centrally to restraint on physical liberty as in house detention, to which other interferences are ancillary, or to a much more amorphous, relativistic concept, has resonance within and beyond the terrorism context, 179 but has not yet been fully resolved.
The tendency currently evident in the UK to rely on non-paradigmatic interferences with liberty in order to avoid the necessity of seeking a derogation from Article 5 has exposed the imprecise standard it seems to denote. 
Article 6 issues
The control orders jurisprudence on Article 6 to an extent mirrors that under Article 5 in terms of the journey that has been undertaken towards a greater acceptance of fair trial standards, 182 but a number of the issues are not addressed in TPIMA or the ETPIMs Bill;
rather, Article 6-compliance relies on such jurisprudence and section 3 of the HRA. In most TPIM (and ETPIM) cases the review hearing under section 9 of the TPIMA (which also applies to ETPIMs) will represent the point at which court intervention occurs; it will normally arise some months after the TPIM/ETPIM has been imposed by the Home Secretary. 183 At the review hearing the court must apply the judicial review principles applicable in deciding whether the decision is flawed. In using the terminology of the PTA, it is assumed that the provisions will be applied subject to the interpretation imposed under section 3 HRA and Article 6(1). 184 The courts apply a more exacting standard of review, including 'intense scrutiny' of the necessity for the measures imposed.
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The review hearing relies on closed and open material. A closed material procedure (CMP) is well established in the context of control orders/TPIMs, and has been accepted by the courts. 186 The provisions governing the procedure did not derive from the PTA, and the same is true of TPIMA and the ETPIM Bill. The provisions are found in the Civil Procedure Rules 181 The key issue in Guzzardi, text to n 102 above. It may be the case that the difference between fourteen and sixteen hours of house detention has less impact in terms of the life the suspect would otherwise have been living -the Guzzardi test -than the effects of a form of internal exile (forced relocation). 182 See for discussion Fenwick & Phillipson n 7 above, 886-889. 183 See comments of Anderson 'TPIMs in 2012' n 33 above, as to the length of time which tends to elapse between imposition of a TPIM and the review hearing, (para 8.12). In non-urgent cases where the Secretary of State seeks the permission of the court the court must give it unless the decision to impose the measure was 'obviously flawed' (TPIMA, s6(3)(a), which will also apply to ETPIM notices). 184 The Government in its ECHR memos on Article 6 in relation to TPIMs and ETPIMs considers on this basis that the provisions relating to court review are compatible with Article 6; TPIMA ECHR memo n 28, para 24-42, and ETPIM Bill ECHR memo, n 29, para 30-1. 185 The test it was found that once some disclosure has occurred, the failure of the TPIM suspect to deal 31 with the allegations to the extent that was possible, having regard to the disclosure given, could be taken into account in relation to the level of suspicion.
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Use of closed material proceedings is about to leach into many other civil actions with a national security dimension, 198 despite criticism of the quality of the information relied on. 199 That expansion of their use provides an example of a trend towards habituation and normalisation of measures in tension with Article 6, as is also apparent in relation to nontrial-based measures that are able to operate outside Article 5(1).
Parliamentary scrutiny

Renewal
Parliamentary scrutiny is reduced under TPIMA 2011 since, unlike the PTA, it will not expire if Parliament does not review and renew it annually, indicating the extent to which these measures have undergone normalisation. The House of Lords' Select Committee on the Constitution questioned 'whether it is constitutionally appropriate to place on a permanent basis such a scheme of extraordinary executive powers.' 200 TPIMA is time-limited to five years under section 21 but the powers can be revived under statutory instrument for further five year periods 201 so, while it might be viewed as an emergency, last resort measure, not only is it very likely to become a familiar feature of the counter-terror landscape, 202 but it is also unlikely to receive significant scrutiny on renewal.
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Scrutiny is similarly reduced in relation to ETPIMs, compared with control orders: in accordance with clause 9 of the draft ETPIM Bill, the operative provisions of the Bill only remain in force for one year but can be renewed or revived by order under the affirmative resolution procedure. 203 Further, the Secretary of State can declare that by reason of urgency that procedure need not be followed, 204 reducing the possibility of scrutiny still further.
Basis for the introduction of the ETPIM Bill
The Deputy Assistant Police Commissioner told the ETPIM Bill Joint Committee that
ETPIMs could be introduced in response to a general rising of the threat level that could be triggered either by an increase in the danger posed by terrorists or a reduction in resources for policing. 205 The Select Committee found that although the Minister in question had said that the resources would continue to be available, there was still uncertainty as to the types of 'exceptional circumstances' that would lead to the introduction of this Bill'. 206 The Government in its Response to the Committee 207 declined to give an exhaustive summary of the trigger circumstances, but stated that they might arise where the country faced a serious terrorist threat that the Government on the advice of the police and the Security Service, judged could not be managed by any other means. This might include a situation where there was credible reporting pointing to a series of concurrent, imminent attack plots, or the period immediately 203 Under clause 9(1) the provisions expire 12 months after the Act is passed. Under clause 9(2)(b)(i) the Secretary of State may, by order made by statutory instrument provide that 'the Secretary of State's enhanced TPIM powers are not to expire at the time when they would otherwise expire under subsection (1) or in accordance with an order under this subsection; but (ii) are to continue in force after that time for a period not exceeding one year'. The order must be made by the affirmative resolution procedure under clause 9(4). The provisions may also be repealed by order at any time, under clause 9(2)(a). Under clause 9(3) Consultation with (a) the independent reviewer; (b) the Intelligence Services Commissioner; and (c) the Director-General of the Security Service must occur before renewal. 204 Clause 9(5). Under clause 9(6) an order that contains such a declaration (a) must be laid before Parliament after being made; and (b) if not approved by a resolution of each House before the end of 40 days beginning with the day on which the order was made, ceases to have effect at the end of that period. But under clause 9(7) if it ceases to have effect that does not affect anything done in reliance on the order, or prevent the making of a new order. 205 Speaking on behalf of Association of Chief Police Officers before the ETPIM Bill Joint Committee, n 30, para 8, in answer to Q39, indicating that the question of the resource-intensiveness of surveillance as opposed to use of ETPIMs could become relevant as a trigger circumstance leading to the introduction of ETPIMs. But he said that 'given the resource currently available' and the changes made to policing, the police 'are adequately managing the risk posed by people subject to TPIMs at the moment (para 21, in answer to Qs 36-39). 206 '[the Minister] was vague as to the circumstances in which the ETPIMs Bill might be introduced for Parliament to consider. We accept that it would be impossible to define a hard and fast 'trigger' for this legislation, but we recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government set out as clearly and unambiguously as possible its understanding of the [trigger circumstances] ibid, para 23. 207 See n 28 above.
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following a major terrorist incident where we faced the prospect of further attacks…
[but would probably not include] a change to the overall terrorism threat level in the absence of other factors.
208
Such uncertainty as to the trigger circumstance for introducing the Bill underpins the concerns that have arisen in Parliament that the legislation is being kept in the 'back pocket'
to be introduced abruptly to be rushed through as emergency legislation, meaning that Parliament cannot debate it fully or subject the basis for introducing the Bill to meaningful scrutiny. 209 The ETPIM Bill Committee suggested that members of the Intelligence and Security Committee could be briefed on the nature of the threat in question, and then asked to communicate a recommendation to Parliament as to whether the case for introduction of the Bill had been made.
210
The 'investigative' element of TPIMs and ETPIMs
The TPIMs/ETPIMs schemes were put forward as resembling the control orders in their preventive aspect, but also as having a genuinely significant investigative element -hence the use of the term 'investigation' in the title of both instruments. The term was intended to emphasise the dissimilarity between these schemes and the control orders one. 211 The apparent stance of the Coalition government, implicit in the use of that term, is that TPIMs are more closely associated with facilitating the criminal prosecution of suspects, and are designed to further that end, rather than being viewed as an end in themselves.
The emphasis under control orders was on the isolation of the controlee, in physical and communicative terms; control orders barred suspects from employing technology -the internet, phones -to facilitate contact with certain associates, thereby preventing TRA. But such bars meant that data that could have been collected by way of electronic surveillance could not be available. Thus the use of control orders tended to be inimical to the prospects of prosecuting the controlees. 212 Interference with the suspect's use of communications technology is also a significant aspect of TPIMA. But, as discussed, the level of interference 208 ibid paras 2 and 3. 209 See ETPIM Bill Joint Committee, n 3, paras 27-32. 210 ibid paras 37, 38. 211 See n 36: the Review proposed the abolition of control orders, partly on the basis of their detachment from the possibility of prosecution (para 23). 212 Review of Counter-Terrorism Powers Lord MacDonald, Report Cm 8003, (2011) 9.
